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Abstract
In health care, overuse and underuse of medical treatments represent equally dan-
gerous deviations from an optimal use equilibrium and arouses concerns about possible
implications for patients’ health, and for the healthcare system in terms of both costs
and access to medical care. Medical liability plays a dominant role among the elements
that can affect these deviations. Therefore, a remarkable economic literature studies
how medical decisions are influenced by different levels of liability. In particular, iden-
tifying the relation between liability and treatments selection, as well as disentangling
the effect of liability from other incentives that might be in place, is a task for sound
empirical research. Several studies have already tried to tackle this issue, but much
more needs to be done. In the present chapter, we offer an overview of the state of
the art in the study of the relation between liability and treatments selection. First,
we reason on the theoretical mechanisms underpinning the relationship under investi-
gation by presenting the main empirical predictions of the related literature. Second,
we provide a comprehensive summary of the existing empirical evidence and its main
weaknesses. Finally, we conclude by offering guidelines for further research.
Keywords: Medical Malpractice, Medial Liability, Treatment Selection, Defensive
Medicine, Empirical Analysis, General Review
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Introduction
In health care, overuse and underuse of medical treatments represent equally dangerous devi-
ations from an optimal use equilibrium. Among the factors that can affect these deviations,
medical liability plays an important role as addressed by a remarkable economic literature
which is the topic of this chapter.
An efficient medical liability system aims to incentivize adoption of an optimal level of
precaution and compensates injured patients. This means that its goal is not the elimination
of all medical errors from the system, rather the elimination of those for which the cost of
prevention is less than the benefit of the avoided injury (i.e., the expected damage).1 There
are two main liability rules targeting errors and the resolution of related claims. Under
a negligence rule, providers are liable if they cannot prove that they complied with the
standards adopted in their specialty. Under strict liability, providers are liable if they cannot
prove that there is no causal link between their actions and an adverse event on the patient.
Both rules and combinations of them are likely to affect the selection of medical treatments
and sometimes the selection of patients on which treatments are performed.
Under a negligence rule, the perceived costs/benefits of taking precaution are influenced
by (i) the certainty and strictness of the standard of care; (ii) the organization of the health-
care system (e.g., physicians working in one or more hospitals); and (iii) the availability and
type of malpractice insurance which limit a doctors’ financial exposure. These three elements
can come in many variations, leading to different degrees of liability for medical practitioners.
As a consequence, they may induce less or more than efficient precautions. In particular,
when physicians perceive a lower level of liability, they may be more prone to undertake
riskier procedures favoring other types of incentives (e.g., private incentives such as mone-
tary gain, or patient-related such as better health outcomes). Differently, in the presence of
high liability, non-optimal use of treatments leads to the so-called phenomenon of defensive
medicine, which can be positive or negative (Danzon 2000; Kessler 2011). Positive defensive
medicine coincides with the use of treatments or diagnostic tools that do not improve the
quality of care delivered to patients, but which are apt to decrease the probability of a legal
claim. This is a form of supplied induced demand and it implies an overuse of procedures
compared to their optimal level. Negative defensive medicine is a sort of cream skimming
of patients or procedures. Less risky patients are selected into treatment to decrease the
probability of negative outcomes, and physicians avoid needed risky treatments due to fear
1For an in-depth explanation of the economics of medical liability, see Danzon(2000), Arlen (2013), and
Grembi (2015).
2
P. Bertoli and V. Grembi Medical Malpractice
of being sued. This is a situation in which a treatment can be underused overall, or the
underuse takes place with respect to a specific segment of the population.2 By the same
token, strict liability systems may also induce a non-optimal use of medical procedures.3 In
particular, no fault systems are more likely to generate forms of negative defensive behavior.
Since the effort and care undertaken in treating patients do not count in assessing the liability
of practitioners, the easiest way to reduce the risk of litigation is to avoid riskier patients
and/or the performance of riskier treatments.
Overuse and underuse of treatments arouses concerns about possible implications for
patients’ health, and for the healthcare system in terms of both costs and access to medical
care. For these reasons, several countries have adopted reforms directly affecting the type of
liability such as, for example, the UK which has introduced enterprise liability to mitigate
the pressure faced by physicians. Other countries have opted for policies discouraging filing
frivolous and unmeritorious claims or decreasing the overall financial exposure of health care
practitioners. For instance, this is the case of those countries (e.g., Italy, France) that have
moved from private malpractice insurance for hospitals to public coverage by forcing regional
governments to “insure” the liability exposure of hospitals through the creation of regional
malpractice liability funds.
However, defining the optimal institutional response is a topic of debate, because there
are factors other than liability pressure that can influence medical decisions. Identifying
the relation between liability and treatments selection, as well as disentangling the effect
of liability from other incentives in place, is a task for sound empirical research. Several
studies have already tried to tackle this issue, but much more needs to be done. The existing
evidence is based almost entirely on the US and disregards the experience of public healthcare
systems, even though the problem of over- and under-use of treatments is equally important
and widespread. The focus on the US experience also entails other two major limitations.
Firstly, the response of physicians to variations in liability has been studied mainly within
a negligence based system. Secondly, the US institutional setting implies some empirical
2Negative defensive medicine can also assume the form of non-adoption of new technologies, since stan-
dards are based on the status quo. For a discussion on how the liability system can deter the adoption of
new technology, see Kessler (2011) and the UK Department of Health (2014).
3Examples of no fault system can be found in some US states with respect to some medical specialties
(e.g., Virginia and Florida), in Belgium and France for victims of medical injuries (Barbota, Parizotb and
Winancea, 2014), and in the Scandinavian countries, though the latter adopt a milder form of no fault rules.
In particular, the Scandinavian countries represent a benchmark which is discussed any time that policy
makers deal with the problems associated with the medical liability system. In addition to having form of
strict liability for practitioners and public insurance coverage, Scandinavian legal claims are not managed
at the court level but by administrative authorities. For a description of these systems see Mello, Studdert,
Kachalia and Brennan (2006) and Ulfbeck, Hartlev and Schultz (2012).
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challenges that may undermine the findings produced so far.
The present chapter offers an overview of the state of the art in the study of the relation
between liability and treatments selection. It discusses the main results of the existing em-
pirical studies and their main shortcomings. First, we reason on the theoretical mechanisms
underpinning the relationship under investigation by presenting the main empirical predic-
tions of the related literature. Second, we provide a comprehensive summary of the empirical
evidence. Finally, we discuss the main weakness of the estimations run so far and conclude
by offering guidelines for further research.
Theoretical Expectations
The assumption of any theoretical prediction on how changes in liability affect medical de-
cisions is that healthcare practitioners are concerned about facing a legal claim. Even when
providers can get insurance for medical liability which reduces their financial risk,4 they still
see malpractice claims as a serious threat because they carry non-insurable costs, including
serious reputational damages (Sage, 2004), and significant psychic and time costs.5
The probability of facing a claim is directly correlated to that of committing an error
which cannot be voided. As suggested by Arlen and MacLeod (2005), although doctors
may raise their level of precaution and invest in their expertise to minimize their chances
of making an error, they cannot eliminate the risk. Consequently, conventional wisdom
interprets overuse and underuse of medical treatments as defensive behaviors on the part of
healthcare providers to decrease their risk of being sued. It relates more intensive treatments
or overuse of treatments to lower probability of claims, so that the higher (lower) the liability
pressure the more (less) likely are intensive treatments. Consider, for instance, the case of a
delivery when a physician has the choice between a cesarean section (more intensity) and a
vaginal delivery (less intensive). With c-sections doctors reduce the risk to the babies (i.e.,
the most expensive potential injured) and they can better control what actually happens
in the delivery room. Hence, conventional wisdom sees a c-section as a defensive mean for
4Claims are unlikely to lead to payouts that exceed the limits of professional liability insurance (Fisk,
1998; Hyman, Black, Zeiler, Silver and Sage, 2007). Moreover, malpractice premiums for hospitals are
partially experience-rated, while those of individual physicians are not (Mello, 2006). Hence, at least on the
individual level, premiums are not expected to increase due to a physicians’ involvement in malpractice suits.
Even if this were not the case, providers can, to some extent, shift insurance premiums to patients by raising
medical fees (Danzon, 1991; Sloan, 1982).
5Seabury,Chandra, Lakdwalla and Jena (2013) show that doctors, on average, spend over 4 years of a
40-year career with an open malpractice claim. However, there is no clear evidence on the magnitude of
reputational costs.
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doctors against the risk of litigation. It follows that whenever there is a decrease in liability
pressure, c-sections should be less appealing to doctors and be less frequently performed.
However, the empirical evidence is mixed in this respect and challenges this interpretation.
To explain the conflicting evidence, more recent contributions try to take a broader picture
into account. Two models best identify this attempt: the model proposed by Currie and
MacLeod (2008) and the one in Shurtz (2014). Currie and MacLeod (2008) is the first model
on the choice between a less and a more intensive treatment, and considers the probability of
a doctor facing a claim related to a medical error both when performing the treatment and
when denying it. Doctors may damage a patient by mistakenly choosing a wrong medical
treatment, but also by withholding a treatment that would have been beneficial. The starting
point of the model is that physicians weigh the costs and benefits of their choices given the
liability rule they face.6 The latter include, among the others, the benefits of treating patients
and monetary incentives. The former consist of the expected liability that physicians will
incur by committing an error. When a physician is indifferent between denying or providing
the treatment to a patient, that patient is defined as marginal. What a variation in liability
does is to change a doctor’s decisions with respect to the marginal patient. As a consequence,
Currie and MacLeod (2008) do not explain how doctors perform a given treatment, but rather
whether they perform it or not. They focus on a quantitative dimension, which is the number
of treated patients, and offer guidance to evaluate the effects of a variation in liability on
the levels and composition of medical activities. Generalizing the findings of the model, the
direction of the impact produced by a change in medical liability on the use of a treatment
is an empirical issue. It depends on the risk-risk trade-off between providing or withholding
the treatment to the marginal patient. The final effect on the utilization rate of a procedure
cannot be uniquely determined ex ante on theoretical grounds. For instance, if we move
from a point in which there is an overuse of a treatment, which means it is not related to
medical factors, then the probability of an error or a negative outcome is higher with the
use of that procedure than without it. This means that whenever an increase in malpractice
pressure strikes (i.e., physicians are held more accountable), the incidence of that procedure
should decrease rather than increase. Differently, in cases of initial overuse, providers have no
incentive to reduce the use of inappropriate procedures after a reduction in liability, rather,
they may be induced to increase them.
Shurtz (2014) addresses the inconsistencies in the empirical literature, providing room
6The model abstracts the resource constraint, which in reality can affect the treatment choice set. Within
this theoretical framework, the decision to provide a treatment or not is driven, on the costs side, exclusively
by liability considerations.
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for the financial incentives borne by practitioners. Basically, according to Shurtz (2014),
the theoretical literature lacks a proper vision of the mechanisms underneath the effects or
the lack of effects due to changes in medical liability. He moves from the initial distinction
made by Currie and MacLeod (2008): physicians might underuse or overuse a treatment,
but he relates these choices to financial incentives. The benefits of a treatment come from
the benefits on the patient conditions and physicians’ monetary benefits. The costs include
medical liability and the opportunity costs of withholding the procedure. In this context,
underuse might be explained by the treatment being too costly, and overuse by the treatment
being extremely beneficial money-wise, even discounting for the risk of errors (i.e., the risk
of being sued). This means that if there is an increase in liability, the costs side of the
decision to perform or not perform a treatment increases, and the change in liability offsets
financial considerations at the margin. As a consequence, when c-sections are underused
because they are unprofitable, an increase of liability makes it even more convenient not to
perform a c-section. When c-sections are profitable, physicians overuse them on the basis
of financial considerations, but an increase in liability contrasts this tendency making c-
sections less appealing. By the same token, lower liability provides further incentives besides
monetary ones to further withhold c-sections, when they are already underused. Conversely,
if the same reduction in liability strikes when c-sections are profitable, this enhances the
physicians’ incentive to overuse cesarean deliveries and c-sections further increase.
Empirical Analysis
The common core of the empirical literature on how malpractice liability affects medical
treatments is to test the existence and assess the magnitude of defensive medicine, and
in particular, positive defensive medicine. This task poses two major empirical challenges.
First, labelling a treatment as underused or overused assumes that it is possible to identify
its optimal use. This is easier in theory than in practice. In practice, optimal use is inferred
ex post by checking whether the effect detected at the treatment level is associated with
any effect on the health status of patients. For instance, besides estimating the effect of a
variation in liability on c-section rates, it is necessary to also estimate the effect on maternal
and neonatal health outcomes. If a decrease in c-sections is combined with no change or
improvement of the health status of mothers and newborns, then the initial level of cesarean
sections is defined as overuse. If their health status deteriorates, the initial incidence of
c-sections was ideal.
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Second, underuse and overuse of treatments can be triggered by several factors, in addition
to liability. Physicians have different skill levels (Currie, MacLeod and Parys, 2017) and/or
are subject to monetary incentives (e.g., Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin, 1999). Hence, it is
important to choose an institutional setting that allows one, to clearly disentangle these
channels from medical liability. In this perspective, the choice of a medical treatment or
medical specialty to be investigated is important. The existing empirical literature focuses
mainly on obstetrics and cardiology. Beside accounting for a significant share of all medical
spending, these specialties require patients’ hospitalization. Hence, problems of sample bias
due to self selection between inpatients and outpatients are minimized. Moreover, the liability
pressure is significant for both cardiology and obstetrics, accounting for the highest levels of
malpractice premiums and claim rates. Thus, a variation in liability should be particularly
salient to their practitioners (Mello and Kachalia, 2010; Avraham and Schanzenbach, 2015).
Another advantage is the possibility of studying substitution between high-intensity and
low-intensity treatments (c-section vs. natural birth, and drug therapy vs. angioplasty and
bypass) in which a physicians’ discretion plays a crucial role.
Overall, the empirical contributions on the effects of medical liability on treatment se-
lection can be grouped in three sets. The first set includes all contributions addressing the
causal relation between treatment selection and changes in liability due to torts reforms (e.g.,
adoption of caps or changes in the type of liability). The second set compares the behavior
of providers facing different degrees of liability (i.e., high vs. low liability pressure) as mea-
sured by the level of malpractice insurance premiums, the frequency of claims and/or their
severity. The third set groups all contributions that use health outcomes (e.g., prenatal care,
mortality rates, complications) as proxied by the healthcare system quality, and infer the
effect on treatment decisions by studying the relationship between changes in liability and
health outcomes. Broad and detailed surveys of these vast sets of papers are provided by
OTA (1993), CBBO (2004), Studdert, Mello and Brennan (2004), Mello (2006), Kane and
Emmons (2007), Nelson, Morrisey, and Kilgore (2007), Mello and Kachalia (2010), Kachalia
and Mello (2011), RAND (2011), and Kessler (2011).
We leave the contributions of the third set out of this review, because they are not focusing
on treatment selection, but they assume that there is one. Hereafter, we focus on attempts
to identify the effect of a change in liability on treatments selection exploiting some sort
of quasi natural experiment, and their main shortcomings. We compare these studies with
those on variations of liability pressure, and draw some policy implications.
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Existing Evidence and Its Limitations
The empirical literature that uses tort reforms as an exogenous variation in liability is entirely
focused on the case study of the US. The period covered by this literature includes liability
reforms from the eighties to the first decade of the new millennium. Most of these reforms
have been common to many US states. As is apparent from Table 1, these reforms are aimed
at making a malpractice claim less profitable for injured parties and their attorneys (e.g.,
caps on damages and caps on contingency fees), or at aggravating the procedural burden of
the plaintiff (e.g. certificate of merit, pretrial screening, and status of limitations). Overall,
the reforms should discourage frivolous or unmeritorious claims, facilitate settlements, and
consequently facilitate more accurate predictions of an insurer’s risk. Hence, tort reforms
are usually associated with lower liability pressure. An exception is the abolition of the joint
and several liability (JSL) rule, which represents an increase in liability (Kornhauser, 2013).
If a claim involves more defendants, such as the hospital and the employed physician, the
physician can rely on group resources to face the claim. JSL reforms eliminate this possibility,
forcing physicians to bear all costs of a trial on the basis of their share of liability.
Table 2 summarizes the major contributions published over the last twenty years, mainly
in economic journals. These works produce mixed evidence, despite the fact that they con-
sider the same country, they exploit the same reforms, they sometimes use the same data,
and they rely on similar empirical strategies. The most common approach exploits the im-
plementation of tort reforms—especially caps on damages— at the state level to group the
states in treated and controls, and to identify the final effect with a difference in differences
estimation.
Among the contributions on obstetrics, tort reforms decreasing liability pressure have
been found to have no impact on cesarean sections (Frakes, 2012; Sloan, Entman, Reilly,
Glass and Hickson, 1997), to decrease cesarean sections (Esposto, 2012), and to increase
cesarean sections (Currie and MacLeod, 2008). Currie and MacLeod (2008) find that caps
on pain and suffering increase the performance of cesarean delivery and complications of
labor, whereas joint and several liability reforms reduce them. This is consistent with the
model that they present, since they argue that the starting point of the system coincides with
an overuse of cesarean sections. Differently, Frakes (2012) suggests that the use of c-sections
is insensitive to tort reforms, including both caps on pain and suffering, and joint and several
liability reforms. Shurtz (2014) offers a further stance. Consistent with his model, the author
shows that caps on pain and suffering (P&S) increase c-section use when the procedure is
more profitable and decrease it for less remunerative mothers. The picture does not improve
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Table 1: Major Torts Reforms Analyzed in the Literature
Tort Reform Basic Description Effect on
Liability Pressure
Panel A: Reforms affecting the payouts
Abolition of mandatory No mandatory interest on either awards for
prejudgment interest pain and suffering or final compensation ⇓
due in relation to the filing of the claim or
occurrence of the injury
Caps on Limits on the economic component of the
Economic Damages compensation for a malpractice case ⇓
Caps on Pain Limits on the noneconomic component (emotional
and Suffering pain and suffering”) of the award that can be ⇓
granted in malpractice cases
Caps on Limits on the award aimed to punish the mis- ⇓
Punitive Damages conduct of the defendant
Caps on Limits on the final award that can be granted in ⇓
Total Damages malpractice cases
Collateral-source Under collateral-source rule, the defendant cannot
Rule Reform bring into evidence amounts paid as compensation
to the plaintiff from other sources (e.g., health
insurance). Reforms to this rule make admissible ⇓
such evidence and allow deduction the amounts
from other sources from the amount due by the
defendant
Patient compensation Patient compensation funds supplement private
Funds (CPFs) malpractice coverage. A CPF pays the part of ⇓
the award exceeding the malpractice coverage of
the defendant
At times, these reforms have been adopted with reference to the entire liability system. At other times, they have affected only
the medical liability.
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Table 1: Major Torts Reforms Analyzed by the Literature (Cont’d)
Tort Reform Basic Description Effect on
Liability Pressure
Panel B: Reforms affecting liability
Join and Several In cases with multiple defendants, reforms to
Liability (JSL) Reform the JSL rule limit what a plaintiff may collect ⇑
from each defendant to their share of liability
Panel C: Reforms affecting claims’ procedure
Caps on Limits on the amount of money that a
Contingency Fees plaintiff’s attorney may receive as contingency ⇓
fee. Caps can be stated as a maximum monetary
value or as a percentage of the damage award
Certificate of When filing a claim or soon thereafter, the
Merit (COM) plaintiff must provide an affidavit attesting that ⇓
a medical expert confirms the merit of the claim
Mandatory Periodic Part or all of the award must be paid to the
Payments plaintiff over an extended period of time as an
annuity, rather than in a lump sum. In case of ⇓
the plaintiff’s death, insurers can terminate
the payment
Pretrial Screening Expert panels are called to express an opinion
Panels on the merit of a claim and, in some cases, on ⇓
damages. Panels’ negative opinions are not binding,
but are admissible into evidence during a trial
Shortening of Shortening the length of time a patient has
Statutes of Limitations to file a claim once she has been injured or she ⇓
has discovered the injury
At times, these reforms have been adopted with reference to the entire liability system. At other times, they have affected only
the medical liability.
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by moving from a difference in differences approach to the use of instrumental variables.
Dubay, Kaestner and Waidmann (1999) use state liability law reforms as an instrument,
concluding that high liability pressure is associated with more c-sections only for some groups
of women (e.g., unmarried women). Esposto (2012) relies on a similar instrument, but
concludes in favor of a generalized increase in c-sections.7
Results are also mixed in the case of cardiology. Kessler and McClellan (1996) find that a
broadly defined class of tort reforms (including caps on pain and suffering) is associated with
a reduction of 5-9% in medical expenditures for elderly heart patients with no consequence
on their health. They take this reduction as evidence that physicians practice defensive
medicine. Kessler and McClellan (2002a) build on their 1996 work and control for managed
care enrollment rates to include the effect of a more cost-conscious environment. The results
are consistent with their previous work, but the magnitude is halved. Later, in a study for
the Congressional Budget Office, Beider and Hagen (2004) try unsuccessfully to replicate
the results of Kessler and McClellan. Sloan and Shadle (2009) revisit the same results and
fail to find any effect on both expenditures and health outcomes. More recently, Avraham
and Schanzenbach (2015) report that caps on pain and suffering reduce treatment intensity
without affecting mortality rates from coronary heart diseases. Overall, the use of angioplasty
and bypass is lower, but there is a substitution effect, with angioplasty becoming more
frequent than bypass. Their evidence is strictly related to the predictions of the model in
Shurtz (2014).
Broadening the class of patients further clouds the picture. For example, according to
Sloan and Shadle (2009), there is no relation, at all between tort reforms and hospitalizations.
Cotet (2012) suggests a negative relation at least between caps on pain and suffering and
surgeries, hospital admissions and outpatients visits, but no effect on emergency care. Xu,
Spurr and Fendrik (2014) points out the importance of the cap’s level. The authors report
that caps on pain and suffering of $250,000 are associated with a reduction in referrals to
specialists, whereas they do not observe any effect for higher levels of caps.
Despite their mixed findings, these studies deserve consideration because they attempt to
assess the theoretical expectations. Yet, they suffer from a series of drawbacks in part due
to some characteristics of the US institutional setting. In the US, different tort reforms are
often enacted together, so that disentangling a malpractice law from others is challenging.
Moreover, a tort reform is usually coded through a binary variable taking the value of 1 when
7Specifically, Esposto (2012) use as an instrumental variable a dummy for the implementation of a tort
reform in the previous 3 years regressed on economic, political, and legal factors to account for the political
environment in a state.
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the reform is active and zero otherwise. However, malpractice laws of the same type come
in many variations. Collapsing them into a dummy variable does not allow one to capture
these variations (e.g., different levels of caps, different nuances of JSL), and fails to take into
account the different intensity of the reforms.8 Finally, this type of coding disregards the
fact that reforms do not necessarily affect medical liability in the same direction.
Given the wide range of malpractice laws and their scattered implementation, there has
been discretionality in deciding what reforms to include in the analysis. The existing studies
make different choices in this respect even when they consider similar time periods and the
same states. For instance, Kessler and McClellan (2002a and 2002b) disregard the imple-
mentation of patient compensation funds included in their 1996 paper. Both Currie and
MacLeod (2008) and Yang, Mello, Subramanian and Studdert (2009) rely on Natality Detail
Files on births in the whole US for similar periods, but the former focus on caps on pain and
suffering and joint and several liability reforms, whereas the latter control for nine different
reforms.
To understand the complexity and magnitude of the problem, consider caps on P&S
and JSL reforms. These two types of reforms are among the most exploited in empirical
studies and, from a theoretical point, they are expected to produce different effects, as shown
in Table 1. Caps should decrease liability pressure, while joint and several liability should
increase it. Figure 1 depicts the adoption of these two reforms in the US states. Data comes
from the Database of State Tort Law Reforms, DSTLR 5th (Avraham, 2015) which is the
primary source on medical liability state laws and covers 1975-2012. The light grey color
indicates the application of caps on P&S, dashes the presence of JSL reforms, dark grey
the joint implementation of caps on P&S and JSL reforms, and white areas coincide with
states which have neither. A simple graphical inspection shows how often these reforms are
concurrent, as well as the great variability in their application, with several states adopting
and repealing them. For instance, Wisconsin was enforcing caps on P&S in 1990. Two years
later, caps were no longer in place, but they were re-instated jointly with JSL in 1995. Given
the expected effects on liability of these reforms, healthcare providers in Wisconsin faced less
pressure in 1990, and more pressure in 1992, while the net result of the opposite effects of
the two reforms in 1995 is questionable. Hence, it is difficult to isolate the effect of a single
reform, or to estimate the joint impact of different reforms.
8For instance, if five reforms decreasing the pressure of liability are implemented in State X and one in
State Y, the intensity of the overall malpractice system in X is likely much lower than Y. However, it might
be difficult to express this with a binary variable. In addition, using a dummy for malpractice laws fails to
control for the effects of those reforms that are upheld or never challenged by courts, and further confounds
the final effect.
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Take in Figure 1 and Figure 2
There is a further complication in how reforms are coded in the US case. Figure 2 has
been plotted always using DSTLR 5th (Avraham, 2015), but in the so-called clever version.
In this case, some reforms are considered not to be in place based on their supposed inability
to affect the liability pressure of physicians. For instance, caps above $400,000 are considered
too high to be binding, thus their implementation is ignored. Similarly, reforms in place for
3 years or less are disregarded. In the case of Wisconsin, this means that the adoption of
caps on P&S in 1990 effectively never happened. Comparing only the adoption of caps on
P&S in a single year, the DSTLR 5th reports 19 states applying caps in 1997, which goes
down to 12 according to the clever version of the DSTLR 5th. Both of these versions of the
dataset on medical malpractice laws have been used in the empirical literature. This may
be one additional cause of the mixed evidence, and further stresses the importance of the
institutional setting for the findings.
Finally, the expectations on caps merit further discussion as they are the most studied of
the possible tort reforms. Regardless of the type of awards they apply to, caps are believed to
have a substantial impact on medical liability. They are supposed to reduce uncertainty on
expected malpractice payouts, as they set a maximum amount that victims can receive. Yet,
caps are upper bounds to damages awards, and their effect on the certainty of compensations
is not clear.9 As they eliminate the right tail of the distribution of compensations, they can
reduce its mean (Avraham, 2007), but it is hard to predict how they impact the variance. In
addition to reducing uncertainty, caps are expected to lower malpractice premiums and reduce
the number of malpractice claims. Higher certainty of payouts and lower average awards
should facilitate more accurate predictions of insurers’ risk exposure and reduce incentives
for injured patients to file a claim. However, the empirical evidence on the effect of caps on
insurance premiums is mixed and inconclusive, as addressed by Kessler (2006), and Zeiler
and Hardcastle (2013).
Liability Pressure
The second main strand of literature on the relation between liability and medical decisions
focuses on the effect of different degrees of liability. Instead of using policy changes as an
9Scheduled damages are an alternative to adoption of caps. Scheduled damages are tiered caps which
establish the precise amount of compensation for every disability percentage, conditional on the victim’s age.
They are adopted mainly outside the US–in the US only for work injuries. For an application, see Bertoli
and Grembi (2017).
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exogenous variation in liability, these papers try to measure liability mainly by looking at the
level of premiums, and the severity and/or frequency of claims. This approach can better take
into account the institutional complexity of the cases under examination. Nevertheless, the
findings of many of these works are again mixed. One explanation is that these contributions
often fail to control for unobserved factors that may affect both the selection of treatment and
the degree of liability. For instance, in the case of c-sections, this would be the case if there is
proof of a correlation between high premiums and high c-section rates without controlling for
the characteristics of the providers and the population. High premiums may reflect the poor
quality of the providers or the poor health status of the population, and both phenomena
may lead to a high incidence of c-sections. In addition, malpractice risk is often measured
through physician-based rather than population-based indexes. Finally, premiums may not
necessarily be a good proxy of liability, because physicians may be unresponsive to their
variations. In fact, since malpractice premiums are not risk adjusted on the basis of individual
claims history, physicians may not associate high premiums with a higher probability of being
sued.
Among these works, those reported in Table 3 are which suffer the least from drawbacks.
In particular, Frakes (2012) and Shurtz (2013) are worth mentioning for the US case. Frakes
(2012) proposes a different policy measure to address the inconsistency of the evidence pro-
duced by the literature, especially the inconsistency about the effects of caps adoption on
use of treatments. The starting point of the study is that under a negligence rule, providers
are held liable when they do not comply with the standard of care adopted in their specialty.
Hence, he collected information on the standards of care for all US states, paying particular
attention to whether and when the states switched from a local to a national standard during
1977-2005. Restricting the field to obstetrics and cardiology, Frakes (2012) finds an enormous
impact of the switch to the national standard on the gap between local and national rates of
procedures. This is an important finding that sheds further light on the mechanisms in place
during treatments selection: physicians are responsive to standards of care. Shurtz (2013)
uses microdata at the physician level to show how physicians behavior changes after being
the target of a liability claim. After a suit, cesarean sections jump to 4%. This evidence
confirms that physicians do care about the risk of being found liable, and is produced by
implementing an event study that allows him to control the specifics of doctors.
In this strand of literature, evidence from other countries and based on public healthcare
systems is also found: in particular Fenn, Gray and Rickman. (2007) and Amaral Garcia,
Bertoli and Grembi (2015). Both papers take advantage of policies that are well targeted
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and identify a variation in liability that occurs in the absence of any other change in the
medical liability system. Fenn et al. (2007) use data from the UK to show how a higher
level of risk exposure due to a pooling insurance scheme increases the use of diagnostic tools,
while Amaral Garcia et al. (2015) provide evidence supporting the model of Currie and
MacLeod (2008). Using Italian data, Amaral Garcia et al. (2015) investigate the effect of
the implementation of an experience rated insurance policy at the hospital level that makes
physicians more accountable. The increased liability pressure proves to lead to a decrease in
the use of cesarean sections.
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Outlines for Future Research
The importance of the liability system in explaining underuse or overuse of treatments is
apparent. The risk of being sued does matter to healthcare providers. Therefore, study
of the relation between medical liability and medical decisions can provide relevant policy
implications for public debate. Given the challenges for empirical research, there are still
several open questions that need to be answered. We identify at least four points that
researchers approaching the topic should take carefully into account.
First, any empirical investigation of the topic needs a clear theoretical framework. Thus
far, the more elaborated models are those provided by Currie and MacLeod (2008) and
Shurtz (2014). Still, many papers disregard these models and keep testing the conventional
wisdom that associate liability changes solely to variations in positive defensive medicine.
This approach should be avoided for two reasons. First, it ignores the role of factors other
than liability which affect the selection of medical treatments (e.g. the form and level of
reimbursements, physicians’ skills). Second, it often proxies changes in liability with policies
for which the effect and/or the intensity of the effect in terms of liability pressure is not clear
as in the case of damages caps.
Overall, more theoretical insights are needed on this topic. Only very recently have con-
tributions begun to consider physicians’ and hospitals self-awareness of their own skills (i.e.,
over/under confidence). Similarly, the importance of reputation for doctors is universially
recognized, thus the role played by reputational concerns in explaining why doctors want to
avoid claims is always taken for granted. Still, such a role may differ in degree, depending on
the institutional context: we could expect that reputational concerns of physicians operating
in a public health care system, or working only for managed care, are different from the
reputational concerns of physicians in private practices.
Second, the selection of the proper treatment to be used as the outcome of interest is
crucial. Levels of hospital expenditures may be a quite fuzzy measure, as well as broad
definitions of healthcare delivery (e.g., hospital admissions, surgeries, or outpatient visits).
Researchers should prefer treatments that have a direct counter-factual representing a more or
less invasive procedure. Comparing the incidence of the two alternatives reduces the possible
noise in the analysis, because it becomes possible to control for other factors influencing the
medical choice such as financial incentives.
Third, hospitals do affect the decisions of the physicians they employ. So far, the vast
majority of the existing literature fails to consider their role. A possible explanation for this
deficiency is the focus on the US case study, where physicians tend to work in more than
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one hospital. Nevertheless, the role of hospitals cannot be denied. As shown by the evidence
from healthcare systems where physicians work only in one hospital (Fenn et al., 2007; Fenn
et al., 2013; and Amaral Garcia et al., 2015), healthcare organizations are quite effective
in conveying their priorities to their employees. Therefore, investigation of the relations
between hospitals and doctors may have important policy implications. Firstly, hospitals can
be crucial to fight abuse of procedures and unnecessary expenditures. Secondly, hospitals
may be a source of distortion in the selection of treatments if they favor objectives other than
efficient provision of health care (e.g., higher profit). In addition, there is a potential high
heterogeneity on how hospitals influence medical decisions depending on their characteristics.
The dynamics and interactions within a teaching hospital can differ substantially from those
in a non-teaching hospital. Similarly, small and large hospitals provide different incentives
to their employees. Physicians working in different types of structures can respond to the
same variation in liability to different degrees. Failing to control for the hospital channel
may muddle these differences and is a missed opportunity to discuss the design of policies
targeted to healthcare structures.
Fourth, much more needs to be done to understand how the organization of the healthcare
market can reinforce or offset the effect of a variation in liability. Empirical research should
devote more effort to investigating what features of the market make physicians more or less
responsive to changes in the risk of being sued. For example, recent literature has shown
that more competition in the healthcare sector is able to foster the overall quality of the
system (Gaynor, Moreno-Serra and Propper 2013; Bloom, Propper, Seiler and Van Reenen,
2015). How does competition affect the providers’ reaction to changes in liability? If fiercer
competition is linked to higher quality, then increasing the competition in the healthcare
system could reduce the room for strategic selection of treatments done by practitioners.
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Figures
Figure 1: Adoption of Caps on P&S and JSL in the US (1977-2010)
Notes: Source Database of State Tort Law Reforms, DSTLR 5th (Avraham 2014). In white, states with no caps and no JSL. In
light grey, states with caps on P&S. Dashed, states with JSL. Dark grey areas are the states with both caps on P&S and JSL.
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Figure 2: Adjusted Adoption of Caps on P&S and JSL in the US (1977-2010)
Notes: Source Database of State Tort Law Reforms, DSTLR 5th (clever) (Avraham 2014). The DSTLR 5th (clever) differs from
the DSTLR 5th as some tort reforms are turned off for different reasons such as caps on P&S being too high to bind. In white,
states with no caps and no JSL. In light grey, states with caps on P&S. Dashed, states with JSL. Dark grey areas are the states
with both caps on P&S and JSL.
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